Stigmatized Spaces: gender and mobility under crisis in South Sulawesi, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT The economic downturn in Indonesia (1997–99) has changed the context of gendered spatial mobility in South Sulawesi. For low-income migrants in the region, the monetary crisis has not only reorganized the labor market, but it has also brought about an intensification of the stigma placed on young women’s independent residence in an export processing zone. Household surveys and in-depth interviews with migrants and members of their origin and destination site neighborhoods, both before and during the economic retrenchment, illustrate that ideas about women’s sexual morality are a key part of the context within which migration decisions are gendered. The article situates survey and interview findings within an overview of Indonesia’s recent development history, economic crisis, and official state gender ideology. The article argues that migrants and their communities have identified the ‘prostitute’ as a female-gendered metaphor for the crisis, and finds that post-1997 narratives of women’s mobility increasingly revolve around normative judgements regarding young women’s independent mobility and sexual behavior.

Introduction

While women’s and men’s migration patterns and experiences in South Sulawesi have been distinct from one another’s since well before the colonial period (Reid, 1988), Indonesia’s economic crisis (1997–99) has intensified these differences [2]. Specifically, the crisis era has coincided with a deepening of the stigma attached to independent women migrants and the export manufacturing zone where they live and work in South Sulawesi. The massive rural-return migration flows that began in Indonesia after the economic downturn in mid-1997 (Brown, 1998; Cameron, 1999) were prompted by extreme inflation, increasingly widespread unemployment and civil unrest. But these material dimensions of the crisis affected low-income women and men migrants differently. In the Makassar Industrial Zone (Kawasan Industri Makassar, or KIMA) in Sulawesi, women migrants faced more intense pressures to return to their villages of origin, while male migrants were encouraged to remain in the zone. Since mid-1997, KIMA’s residents and their sending communities have viewed KIMA as an increasingly stigmatized place where they believe prostitution has grown more widespread over time. Migrant communities have extrapolated these ideas about the place into gendered moral-spatial codes that have played a critical role in differentiating women’s and men’s crisis-era mobility pressures and experiences.

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The destination site of this research, Ujung Pandang’s industrial manufacturing zone (KIMA) in South Sulawesi, was developed as part of the Indonesian state’s recent, increasingly liberal policy stance towards foreign direct investment (Hill, 1994) [3]. Since the mid-1980s, the state has welcomed international capital into Indonesia as part of its export-oriented development strategy, and increases in foreign direct investment have spurred substantial growth in the textile, garment and footwear industries (Lambert, 1993). The Indonesian state has planned and developed Export Processing Zones (EPZs) as part of its set of methods for ensuring a disciplined labor force and continuing to attract transnational investors. Within these zones in general, labor controls are extensive, and in Indonesia in particular, direct controls are enforced with military intervention (Hadiz, 1997).

The policing of factory laborers takes on gender-specific meanings in the case of EPZs, in which women worldwide constitute between 63 and 90% of the workers (Heyzer, 1986; Moore, 1988; Sklair, 1991; Chant & McIlwaine, 1995a; Silvey, 1997). An examination of migrants’ encounters with the changing gendered constraints on their spatial mobility provides insights into the ways that the national economic crisis is interpreted and narrated locally, and how local understandings of masculinity and femininity interact with national and international flows and crises of capital and cultural meanings (Ong & Peletz, 1995). Specifically, a focus on gendered mobility and the views of gender norms among low-income migrants during the recent economic downturn permit an interrogation of local struggles over gender ideology in the state’s efforts to discipline citizens for its larger projects of modernization and development.

Analyses of the gender division of labor in EPZs have demonstrated that widespread assumptions about appropriate gender roles underlie the feminization of the low-wage migrant labor force. The literature argues that the recruitment of a predominately female labor force is based on gender-specific ideologies, such as women’s presumed inherent manual dexterity and docility and an assumption that women’s work provides only supplemental income for the family (Safa, 1981; Lim, 1983; Ong, 1987; Chant & McIlwaine, 1995b). Many women workers in EPZs are also young and single. Their assumed lack of knowledge of industrial labor practices and their supposed freedom from child-rearing responsibilities is understood to make them uniquely amenable to exploitation in industrial production (Ong, 1987; Wolf, 1992; Eviota, 1992). In Indonesia, similar assumptions about young women as an especially exploitable segment of the labor market clearly play a role in shaping gender divisions of labor (cf. Lok, 1993).

As Sylvia Chant & Cathy McIlwaine (1995b, p. 148), however, point out, “[I]t is extremely difficult to generalize about employment practices in EPZs within individual countries, let alone from one part of the world to another”. Chant & McIlwaine argue that women confront different labor controls depending on an EPZ’s place in a country’s broader political economy and the gender relations tied to that context. I build on this insight with an examination of the changing political economy and attendant transitions in gender relations in the Makassar Industrial Zone since the monetary crisis of mid-1997. Focusing on this period of transition highlights the changing relationships between household relations, individual migration decisions, and the broader political-economic context.

The majority of workers in EPZs are migrants (Armstrong & McGee, 1985; Porpora et al., 1989; Chant & McIlwaine, 1995a; Silvey, 1997). Feminist geographic studies of migration reveal that women’s migration decisions and experiences are distinct from men’s in that women weigh both reproductive and productive labor demands (Radcliffe, 1991; Chant, 1992; Lawson, 1998). Other research has found that sexual norms are a
Gendered Spatial Mobility in South Sulawesi

This project synthesizes the attention to the gendered cultural struggles within EPZs with the geographers’ attention to gendered mobility decisions. I am interested here in understanding how individual interpretations of women’s sexual morality interact with local, household and national gender discourses to shape mobility decisions and experiences in a changing economic context [4]. Specifically, I focus on exploring the way these issues play out in South Sulawesi, because this region, despite its historic and economic importance (Reid, 1988), remains relatively under-studied (Barlow & Hardjono, 1996). Migrants in South Sulawesi play roles in constructing their gender identities and the cultural geographies of their destination site through discourses surrounding migrants’ sexual and familial moralities (also see Mather, 1985 on Java, and Ong, 1991 for a more general review). Tracing the shifting and contested meanings of ‘good girls’, ‘obedient daughters’, ‘virtuous women’, and ‘respectable places’ among migrants, and members of their origin-site households brings into focus the ways in which the cultural struggles over gender norms influence the causes and consequences of mobility. In particular, migrants’ own narratives and those of their household members in origin sites and community members in the destination site illustrate the complex ways that individuals interpret these cultural norms of appropriate gender behavior and mobility.

The article is divided into five sections. The first section outlines the study’s context, with details of the national-level economic situation, an overview of both the ‘miracle’ years and the current crisis, and a brief review of the gender ideologies promulgated by both the New Order (1965–98) and the crisis-era states. The following section introduces the Makassar Industrial Zone, the destination site of the migrants interviewed, and provides a comparative overview of the pre-crisis and crisis-era fieldwork observations, focus group interviews and household survey results. The two sections that follow extend these survey results with excerpts from in-depth and life history interviews with migrants, their household members and rural-return migrants (total original $n = 60$ for South Sulawesi) for the two time periods (1995 and mid-1998) [5]. The article then concludes with a discussion of the ways that a focus on the relationships between economic change and ‘moral geographies’ can enrich understanding of gender in shaping migration [6].

Neo-liberalism in Indonesia: whose miracle, whose crisis?

Between 1983 and 1997, a range of national-level neo-liberal reform packages was implemented to intensify and deepen Indonesia’s international trade ties [7]. Partly as a response to a drop in oil revenues between 1982 and 1986 (Booth, 1992), and partly in response to international pressure, the Government began introducing deregulation and structural adjustment packages in 1985 (Hill, 1994; p. 63). These packages have been directed at reducing restrictions on foreign and domestic investment, simplifying the system of permits in the industrial and trade sectors, expanding commercial banking opportunities, and ‘clarifying’ activities in customs and tariffs (Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER], 1991; Syarir, 1991; Arndt, 1983; Hill, 1994). The growth in incomes that followed the implementation of these policies was dramatic, and between 1986 and mid-1993, for the first time, a 4.2% average growth rate in gross national product (GNP) per capita was maintained without oil revenues magnifying the figures (Rigg, 1997; p. 6). Growth rates such as these lifted Indonesia into the ranks of the ‘baby tigers’ within
economic development circles that saw Indonesia as following the so-called East Asian miracle of export-oriented growth. It was within this triumphalist international and national policy environment that the development of an EPZ was planned for South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Yet neither the proponents nor the critics of liberalization (cf. Syarir, 1991; Jones & Manning, 1992; p. 379; Lambert, 1993; Manning, 1993; Utrecht & Sayogo, 1994; p. 48; Hadiz, 1997) could have predicted the severity of the 1997–98 economic retrenchment.

In mid-July of 1997, the Indonesian currency (the *rupiah*) was allowed to float against the dollar, which led to an almost immediate 70% loss of its value (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 1997). In the first 6 months of 1998, the IMF (1998) estimated that consumer price inflation was 46.5%, and in the first quarter of 1998 food prices rose 35%. Some 40% of the population was living just above the poverty line prior to the crisis, whereas by 1998, this entire group had fallen beneath the official poverty line [8]. Crisis-driven unemployment was estimated on average to affect one member per household, or 11.8% of the population (IMF, 1998). These economic shocks, and the fuel price increase imposed by the IMF in May 1998 in particular, were centrally implicated in setting off the riots and demonstrations that led to the end of President Suharto’s 32 years of rule, also in May 1998. In December 1998, further riots broke out in several major cities, including Ujung Pandang, as a combined result of the continuing economic crisis, and the persistent opposition to the leadership of the new president B. J. Habibie and his Parliament [9].

Women and men have been situated differently in relation to the economic downturn, political instability, and civil unrest in Indonesia since mid-1997. Early investigations have reported massive rural-return migration in general (Cameron, 1999), and have argued that based on what is known about economic crises in other contexts, it is likely that the burdens of the crisis will be more acute for women than men within low-income households (Brown, 1998). The specifics of these gender differences and the ways they have been reconstructed since the monetary crisis of 1997 (popularly known as ‘*krismon*’) are illustrated in the ideologies and practices of ‘appropriate’ versus ‘immoral’ feminine mobility. Examining these gender differences is central to understanding the overall meaning of the crisis because, as Aihwa Ong (1995; p. 187) writes, ‘gender politics are seldom merely about gender; they represent and crystallize nationwide struggles over a crisis of cultural identity, development, class formation, and the changing kinds of imagined community that are envisioned’. The Indonesian state’s nationwide goals of capitalist economic development, political cohesion and social order have been implemented partly through a set of policies that both implicitly and explicitly manufacture a particular and idealized vision of gender relations.

Suharto’s New Order government [10] implemented development policies that involved disciplining the population along gender lines. The New Order’s gender regime is what Julia Suryakusuma (1996, p. 102) terms ‘Bapak-Ibuism’ (father-motherism), or the:

state’s predominant gender ideology ... with bapak [father/man] as the primary source of power and ibu [mother/woman] as one source of that power. New Order paternalism fits both Javanese ‘feudalism’ and military deference to hierarchical power and authority. State Ibuism [motherism] is part and parcel of the bureaucratic state’s effort to exercise control over Indonesian society.
As president, B. J. Habibie continued propagating ‘Bapak-Ibuism’ in a number of ways: broadcasting the New Order’s ‘messages of self-discipline and self-sacrifice even more emphatically to women than to men, stressing the importance of motherly selflessness and the restraint of personal desire for the sake of family and nation’ (Brenner, 1998; p. 21). The state, as part of its modernizing strategy, currently ‘defines women as appendages of their husbands and casts female dependency as ideal’ (Suryakusuma, 1996; p. 98). There is a good deal of consensus among researchers (cf. Wolf, 1992; Blackwood, 1995; Sunindyo, 1996; Suryakusuma, 1996; Brenner, 1998) that the New Order state’s official vision of womanhood idealizes the roles of wife and mother and expects the exemplary woman to make the domestic sphere her primary domain [11]. Women migrants in the Makassar Industrial Region, however, pose a threat to the state’s idealized gender norms, and their struggles reveal key contradictions in the state’s gender ideology.

The Makassar Industrial Region: gender under crisis

Relatively little research attention has been focused on the economic changes in Sulawesi or other parts of the ‘Outer Islands’, where economic growth rates have lagged far behind those of Java and Bali (Barlow & Hardjono 1996) [12]. In the early 1990s, however, studies found that in rural areas in South Sulawesi, many people were underemployed and unemployed in agriculture (McPhail, 1993; Sondakh, 1996) [13], and growing numbers of young people in rural areas viewed themselves as overqualified for farmwork (Hill, 1996). Simultaneously, the urban population of Ujung Pandang had been growing ‘at a rate faster than equivalent-sized Javanese cities, increasing at an annual average rate of 5.5 percent since 1971’ (Kristanto et al., 1989; p. 402). The urban areas of South Sulawesi maintained a steady 4.5% growth rate between 1983 and 1995 (BPS, 1997; p. 32). But since the beginning of the crisis, rural-return migration has increased, and as a result, urbanization rates have fallen (Cameron, 1999).

The province of South Sulawesi, however, has faced low economic growth rates relative to other provinces and has been among the regions pressuring the central government to balance regional industrial and economic development (Hill, 1996). Partly in order to improve Ujung Pandang’s macro-economic future and to take advantage of its location as ‘the gateway to Eastern Indonesia’, a Presidential Decree in 1988 stated that land should be allocated and infrastructure developed for industrial estates intended to facilitate industrial activity (Malik, 1991; p. 11). South Sulawesi’s industrial estate, the Makassar Industrial Region (KIMA), was thus scheduled to be built in the municipality of Ujung Pandang and located approximately 20 kilometers from the city center [14]. In 1995, the demographic make-up of the population at KIMA was quite similar to that found in studies of EPZs in other places (cf. Ong, 1987; Chant & McIlwaine, 1995b); the majority (84%) fell between the ages of 15 and 28, were not married, and did not have children (DTKRI-KWPSS Departemen Tenaga Republik Indonesia, Kantor Wilayah Pusat Sulawesi Selatan [Indonesian Labor Department, Central Regional Office for South Sulawesi], 1995; and my follow-up survey in 1998) [15].

Workers were housed in dormitories built on and near the land set aside for the industrial region. Unmarried women and men, and also some families, shared rooms with one to three other factory workers or informal sector workers of the same sex. While all rooms of unmarried workers were formally sex-segregated, many young women and men spent time in one another’s rooms at all hours of the day and night. The zone’s ‘household composition’ thus diverged considerably from those of migrants’ origin-site
households, which were for the most part extended families. The sharing of space among unrelated, unmarried young women and men lay in sharp contrast to the state’s idealized version of nuclear family households (Brenner, 1998) and was central to local people’s characterizations of the zone as a place where people of questionable moral stature lived.

Prior to the monetary crisis, the two most commonly reported reasons for young women’s migration to KIMA were the desire to leave parents and the hope of finding a husband while living and working at KIMA (Silvey, 1997). In 1995, dating (berpacaran) was prevalent in the zone, and since the opening of the region, it had become common to observe young, unmarried male–female couples holding hands while walking along the street. Interviews with origin-site families in four key sending areas (Tegal, Maros, Takalar and Jeneponto) revealed that rural parents’ knowledge of these ‘free’ (bebas) inter-sex relations at KIMA, and in the city of Ujung Pandang more generally, raised their fears about loss of control over their daughters’ sexuality. By 1998, such fears had intensified in both origin and destination sites, as was evidenced by significantly more vociferous public admonishment of pre-marital relations between young men and women, detailed in the following section. While this increased moralizing had not significantly transformed the young respondents’ actual relationships with one another, except to make them slightly more discreet, it had influenced the community and household contexts within which gendered migration decisions were made. During the crisis, intra-household tensions concerning young women’s independent migration have heightened, and the stigmatization of women migrants who have continued to live in KIMA has intensified.

Even prior to the economic downturn, residents in KIMA and their sending communities agreed that the zone was a place with looser sexual mores than the villages, and that there was a general stigma attached to migrants who lived and worked in the region. The shame that was associated with KIMA as a place was partly based on the reputation of the region as a zone where prostitution was widespread. While there had reportedly been several sex workers living in KIMA in 1995, none of those interviewed prior to the crisis mentioned having themselves been involved in sex work. By 1998, when the local population was facing significantly more economic hardship, both of the remaining original women migrants reported earning their income through sex work. Most respondents represented sex workers as victims of krismon who deserved sympathy (kasihan, or ‘poor dears’). They expressed this sympathy, however, in conjunction with moral judgement directed at the prostitutes whom they viewed as ‘fallen women’.

By 1998, people within the region were more likely to reveal their own involvement in sex work than they had been in 1995 [16]. From the perspective of sending communities, however, as sex work began to be seen as more normal in the region, the place itself began to be viewed with more fear and disdain. These changes in the moral context of gendered migration, and in the tenor of the stigmatization of KIMA, had clear implications for women’s and men’s different mobility experiences and decision-making processes.

In addition to concerns about sexual behaviour and gendered morality, mobility decisions were also influenced by migrants’ everyday financial realities. Prior to the crisis, many workers had subsisted on their incomes and subsidies from their rural families (Silvey, 1997; and see Wolf [1992] for similar findings in rural Java in the late 1980s), but the inflation associated with the crisis had significantly lowered the living standards of all residents at KIMA. Most residents in the dormitories who had been eating two meals per day in 1995 were now able to afford only one, and those who had been sharing rooms with one person were now sharing with two or more. Of the 60 migrant
workers interviewed in 1995, only 17 remained resident in KIMA, and of these only two were women [17].

Narrative interviews suggest that while job loss and poverty were crucial motivators of rural-return migration, the sex difference in return migration rates under crisis had also been shaped by the gendered experiences of KIMA as an increasingly stigmatized space for women [18]. The state’s version of ideal femininity, much of which paralleled local moral codes, could not be maintained within KIMA in 1998. Under the conditions created by the monetary crisis, women living in KIMA were no longer able to present themselves as chaste, respectable women. Masculinity, by contrast, was not threatened to the same degree by residence in KIMA during *krismon*. Several young migrant men did express extreme frustration associated with loss of income and purchasing power, but their mobility decisions and experiences were not as deeply embedded as were women’s in questions of sexual morality. Instead, men’s crisis-era decisions to stay in urban areas tended to be most strongly linked to financial responsibility, as they had been prior to the crisis.

The state’s versions of gender norms paralleled some of the narrated ideals in origin- and destination-site communities. The idea that men should provide for their families formed the basis of men’s and women’s explanations for male mobility or lack thereof, both before and during the crisis. For women, the state’s notion that they should follow their husbands’ mobility routes informed women’s own explanations of their mobility as partly a quest for a husband. This same ideology of women acting as appendages to their husbands encouraged single women to return to their origins once their residence in KIMA was more likely to threaten their reputation and marriageability in the future (see following section). The state’s gender ideology was also reflected in migration decisions through the state’s conception of the family and the appropriate roles for particular members of the household. While young single men could situate themselves within the state-sanctioned role of *perantau*, or migratory breadwinner, whether or not they actually provided remittances for their families, single women migrants did not have a similarly respectable place in the state’s discourse on family gender norms.

Discussions with workers and their families revealed that the economic crisis had brought with it a climate of generalized fear, and that young people’s pre-marital sexual encounters constituted only one among many threats to their sense of safety, well-being and order. Discussions of young people’s, and especially young women’s, sexual morality were intertwined with other concerns in interviews. Whether people were discussing their personal safety during the riots, their economic future in farming communities, or their worsening poverty, the issue of young women’s sexual morality was a central theme.

**Moral Geographies: narrating pre-crisis stigma and prestige**

My cousin was working in Ujung Pandang, and she came home to visit our village at *Hari Raya* [19]. She was full of stories about dating. She told me that she went out on Saturday nights … So, I planned to follow her to the city … That is how I decided to go … [I asked, ‘What did your parents say?’] My parents do not like the idea of this place, because they are old-fashioned. (Eta, 18, factory worker, KIMA, Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi) [20]

This excerpt from one young woman’s life history narrative illustrates the conflicts that many young women migrants experienced regarding their possible mobility in the face of economic development and neo-liberal industrialization. The tensions between gener-
ations surrounding young women’s dating behavior, and by extension their sexual piety, have been critical to migration decisions for Eta and the other women migrants I interviewed in KIMA. Prior to the crisis, women’s migration decisions and experiences were shaped by intergenerational struggles over moral and sexual identity and the changing gender norms associated with economic development. Young, low-income men who were potential migrants were also embedded in, and active in shaping, this context of gender norms that influenced mobility and morality. It was, however women’s sexual piety and independent migration that emerged as the focus of the most intense cultural contestations [21]. Thus, I analyze both women’s and men’s mobility decisions in relation to a femininity that is seen to require moral protection, and to a lesser extent, address the norms of masculinity that exerted pressure on men to remain in the urban labor market under crisis.

Prior to the crisis, women migrants in KIMA and their non-migrant counterparts in sending areas oscillated between some long-standing community and state-supported meanings of family morality as well as newly conceived images of, and desires for, what they viewed as modernity (‘modern’ in the Indonesian language), ‘freedom’ and independence from their families. The following excerpts and interpretations of narratives by migrants illustrate some of the most salient tensions characterizing the pre-crisis gendered context of migration decisions. Ratna, a 16 year-old worker in a cookie factory, discusses why she left her rural home to come to KIMA:

I ran away when I grew tired of being at home, because my stepfather and I were not compatible. That was not a home for me, not a family. I remember how much my mother told me to be quiet. I could not just be myself there. I could not be independent.

In this passage, Ratna expresses her struggles with her family’s constraints on her behavior and her desire to be independent (‘mau mandiri’). Ironically, after migration, Ratna faced a factory disciplinary regime in KIMA that placed extreme controls on her behavior during working hours. Factory workers are constantly watched by shop floor managers who keep them from speaking to one another, from walking around the factory, and from going to the toilet at any point other than the designated break time (see also Smyth & Grijns, 1997). But these constraints on Ratna’s behavior were not as disturbing to her as the fact that she did not have what she considered a home or family before she migrated. She wanted to be ‘independent’ and defined that independence as compatible with working in an urban factory away from her family.

In that Ratna desired ‘independence’ from her family, her goals were at odds with the state’s ideal of a nuclear family living under one roof. On the other hand, her own notions of the ideal family, within which she would have been compatible with her stepfather, fit well with the village ideal of a harmonious family [22]. Ratna’s narrative invokes the state and village ideals of nuclear, peaceful families. She says that she left home partly because her real family did not match her ideal family. Yet through her mobility Ratna also undermines the possibility of that idealized family form for herself, and in so doing precludes her own incorporation into the state’s predominant set of household gender norms. While she did not express an awareness of flaunting state or village gender norms, her independent mobility in fact situated her behavior outside of those family ideals and gender norms expressed by her parents, village neighbors and the state.

Similar issues were raised by Titiek a 19 year-old who worked in an instant soup
factory. Titiek pointed to being ‘free’ and preferring KIMA to her rural origins because it provided her with distance from her parents’ surveillance:

It’s ramai [bustling, lively, festive] here. We like it better here [than in the village] because we’re free. The boys like it better because there are lots of girls [laughter]. We just like it because our parents can’t guard us.

Later, however, Titiek revealed that she felt ashamed that she did not frequently visit her parents, and was concerned that her reputation as a ‘good, marriageable girl’ would be tarnished by her time at KIMA. Indeed, prior to the crisis, many respondents considered KIMA a place where only those with questionable moral standards lived. Similar to Ratna’s ambivalent position vis-à-vis the state’s family ideologies, Titiek expressed shame and concern that she was not living up to the dominant and state-disseminated ideals of young womanhood. Her desire to be ‘free’ from her parents’ surveillance and to enjoy the liveliness of a mixed-sex environment placed her on the margins of the state’s and village’s predominant gender ideology.

Another woman, Ani, was 22 years old and worked in a plastic bag factory. She expressed similarly conflicted sentiments surrounding rural expectations regarding marriage and departed her rural origins in order to gain some ‘independence’:

My friend’s husband was always playing main-main, connotes flirting and possibly having minor affairs with other women and having girlfriends. She would complain, and I did not want that. I want to be independent, and not depend on my parents.

Here, Ani expressed her sense that the expectations placed upon rural wives were so unappealing that they contributed to her migration. But also the quotation indicates that she viewed the city as a place which might allow her to form an identity different from those subject positions prescribed for women by the state (i.e. daughter, wife, or mother [Sears, 1996]), one which would allow her to be ‘independent’.

If these women had not viewed their spatial mobility as providing them with some freedom or independence, a significant part of their narrated motivations for pre-crisis migration would have disappeared (also see Enloe, 1989). Their sense of being modern and free was central to the ways these women understood their pre-crisis motivations for migration, and it was part of what made these young women available for low-wage labor in the factories [23]. Whereas the state’s gendered development discourse defines subject positions from which women may choose these young women—who have left their families of origin and are not yet married—do not fit neatly within the state’s predominant set of identities. Their desires for freedom and independence from their families and the general silence on single women’s work as wage laborers in the state’s discourse on women formed a key part of the context within which these women migrated prior to the crisis. As the economic crisis has deepened throughout the country, the migration and employment possibilities open to these women have changed, as have the ways that these young women’s communities of origin and destination conceive of ‘appropriate’ roles for them.

**Gendered Migration under Crisis: sex work and household dynamics**

As the crisis has intensified, KIMA residents have faced high rates of unemployment, and a decline in their real wages [24]. Partly because of their worsening economic positions, some women who have remained in KIMA have turned to sex work to survive. Those women who have left the region have done so largely because surviving in KIMA
without engaging in some supplemental income-earning activity, such as sex work, has become substantially more difficult. In addition, tensions surrounding women’s morality and migration have intensified both within households and origin communities, placing heightened social pressure on women to return to their village families.

Of the 30 women originally interviewed in 1995, only two remained in KIMA in 1998, and both were engaged in sex work [25]. These two women resided in the dormitory room that they had shared since 1995, and they shared food expenses and cooking responsibilities with one another. Both women had lost contact with their origin households. One woman (Tati) explained that her family was too poor to provide any subsidies for her, and that because they had given her so little, she did not feel obligated to send remittances. The other woman (Risa) confided that she was so estranged from her family that she did not know their financial standing. She was not interested in communicating with them, and she did not consider providing assistance for them [26].

When I asked these two women how their broken family ties were related to their involvement in sex work, their responses recalled the national discourse on the family. Tati, who was 22 years old, and had been living and working at KIMA since 1994, said:

If my family had been a good family, and my father and mother had taken care of me the way they were supposed to, indeed, I would not be here now. But my family was very poor, and my mother left us when she worked in the rice fields. My father never advanced [maju, rose in the ranks, succeeded]. After fifth grade, they never paid for any more school for me. Now there is this monetary crisis [krismon], so many of us now have to be prostitutes [wanita tuna susila]. But it is worse if your family is bad, and that is why we don’t have a choice.

This quotation reveals several dynamics that are central to the gendered processes shaping the context of Tati’s sex work and mobility in KIMA during the crisis period. First, Tati evaluates her family’s worth negatively because she continues to live in KIMA since the crisis (‘If my family had been a good family … I would not be here now’). Second, she considers her family less ‘good’ because her mother worked in the rice fields and her father ‘never advanced’. Both of these judgements are reflective of the state’s idealized gender norms which posit a male breadwinner and a female housewife. Tati’s perspective on her parents’ failings was partially shaped by comparison to her origin-site neighbors, most of whom, while slightly better off financially, were also farming families in which both parents and many grandparents worked in the fields. But her view of the ideal family also paralleled the state’s set of messages that she had encountered through discussions with friends and state-controlled television programming. Indeed, when I asked Tati to define a ‘good’ mother, she pointed to popular images on television that dovetailed with the state’s image of the middle-class housewives as the developmentalist ideal [27].

Tati saw the monetary crisis as having pushed her and ‘most’ (in her words, kebanyakkan) women at KIMA into the sex work that had become commonplace in the zone by 1998. But she nonetheless regretted that her ‘bad’ family had been unable to save her from the stigma associated with such work. From Tati’s perspective, her continued residence in KIMA during krismon, involvement in sex work, and her decision not to return to her rural origins were each set within a conception of the ideal developed family that she saw herself as lacking [28]. Similarly, Risa viewed her mobility and labor market decisions as embedded within family dynamics as these were linked to regional
development. Risa underscored the opposition she encountered from her family when she first suggested to them that she might want to migrate to work in KIMA:

My mother was afraid for me, and said that I wouldn’t ever get engaged [to be married] if I came here. And, my father forbade me to come. So, I ran away, like a lot of girls here, because I knew there were jobs available [pembangunan jadi, literally ‘development was happening’]. But some of the girls [who had run away] went home later, and then their parents were more accepting [of their work and residence at KIMA]. But I never went home again, because I’m afraid my father would hit me, because he doesn’t understand development. And, now I am doing just what they were afraid I would do [i.e. prostitution] … ‘What has changed since the crisis?’ I asked.] The monetary crisis makes everything worse, because now we can’t even have our dreams.

Risa’s father was sufficiently concerned about the stigma that would be attached to his daughter if she went to KIMA that he forbade her to migrate. Indeed, it appears that Risa’s family was more adamantly opposed to her initial migration that were many other families (‘some went home again … [b]ut … I am afraid my father might hit me’). However, she ‘ran away’ from home because she knew there were employment opportunities available at KIMA and that she could support herself. She realized, however, that since the crisis began she could not ‘even have [her] dreams’, which, as she discussed later, consisted of some independently earned income, some urban consumption and some independence from her family of origin. Those dreams had not included participation in prostitution [29]. Her sense that ‘everything is worse’ under crisis was a reference to her dislike of feeling forced to engage in sex work, and her disillusionment with her life at KIMA. These dimensions of her experience are distinctly gendered in that the specific family dynamics she reports were focused on her morality as a daughter, and the family’s conceptions of development revolved around what women’s roles in development should be.

Both of these women’s understandings of the forces operating in their mobility and labor market decisions under crisis were quite similar to those expressed by several women who had returned to their origin sites. In follow-up interviews with women returnees and members of their households, three interconnected themes were most salient. First, not surprisingly, all of the rural-returnee women said that the monetary crisis had caused severe hardship for them in the city. None of them had lost their jobs, but all of them had found their wages insufficient as inflation had pushed the prices of basic necessities beyond their reach. Second, each of these women discussed her family’s set of reactions to the deepening economic crisis and reported that most parents expressed increased fear and concern for their daughters since the beginning of the crisis. Parents expressed general concern about the potential for worsening violence in urban areas under crisis, but they also voiced specific fears about the potential for sexual victimization and the need to preserve their daughters’ sexual purity. Third, while KIMA had already established a reputation as a red light district, it was only after the beginning of the crisis that rural-origin households began to see women migrants to KIMA as necessarily involving themselves in sex work. This clearly gender-differentiated set of moral-spatial codes was circulated not only by the young women’s parents, but also the young women themselves, their male counterparts, and their siblings.

One woman (Ibu Lin), who lived in a rice-farming community in Maros, and whose
daughter had been at KIMA for less than a year when the crisis began, stated her perspective on gender norms thus:

I know she cannot make enough [to live on] now, since the monetary crisis [began]. And, I know that Jakarta was like a sea of fire [lautan api], and they [the rioters] raped a lot of women there. I don’t want her to be hurt. It is very dangerous in the city now, and especially for the girls … because when no rules are being obeyed, then women do not get respected, either. ‘What do you mean, respected?’ I asked.] Sometimes they get raped, and sometimes they become sluts [anak nakal, translates literally as ‘naughty kids’, but in this usage in KIMA had a meaning closer to ‘sluts’, in English].

In other words, Ibu Lin knew that the riots in Jakarta had involved rapes, and she feared that social unrest in Ujung Pandang would be characterized by similar crimes. Understandably, she worried that her daughter would become the victim of sexual violence. But it is noteworthy that in the same breath, when she describes what it means for women to be disrespected, she mentions both rape and ‘becom[ing] sluts’. For Ibu Lin, to ‘become a slut’ referred to engaging in sexual activities outside of marriage, whether those activities were paid or not. When I asked Ibu Lin whether this increased ‘naughtiness’ or prostitution and sexual activity on the part of women was a result of the financial crisis or the fact that ‘no rules are being obeyed’, she argued that the two could not be separated from one another. She saw the crisis as one of both morality and economy, though she perceived its negative effects as concentrated in the urban areas. This was a view expressed repeatedly in focus group interviews in the four key sending areas. For Ibu Lin, then, in order to protect her daughter from both the economic hardship and the moral/sexual dangers of the crisis, it was necessary to bring her daughter home to rural safety.

Ibu Lin’s daughter Farida came home partly because her parents were insistent that she do so. Farida said that since the crisis had begun, not only was she finding it difficult to pay the rent for her dormitory room after she had paid for food, but also that she was afraid that if she did not return home, her parents were going to threaten her with withdrawal of the food subsidies that they had provided for her in the past. While her parents denied ever having considered the withdrawal of food, they admitted that they used strong words when speaking with their daughter. Farida, 18 years old and in KIMA for less than a year, remembers their admonitions:

My mother said I was living where everyone was a prostitute, and that if I didn’t come home, everyone would think I was one [a prostitute], too. She said that since the crisis, no girls could stay pure if they stayed at KIMA. My father, too, was angry, [he was concerned] about my being able to get engaged [to be married, dijodoh]. [According to him,] KIMA would make me ugly [menjeleki]. Of course, they were correct. Everyone is a prostitute at KIMA, now. And, I must listen to my parents; they brought me into this life. ‘What did your brother say to you?’ I asked.] My brother told me, of course, that they [the parents] were right. They told my brother to tell me to come home. But he got to stay in the city.

This quotation again suggests the idea that residence in KIMA can stigmatize a woman with the reputation of being a sex worker, and that at least this family sees it as their responsibility to ‘protect’ their daughter from that fate. Further, this excerpt from the interview with Farida highlights her family’s shared understanding of KIMA as a place where ‘everyone is a prostitute’. ‘Everyone’ in this case did not include men, however,
who were not as a general rule called home from within KIMA since the *krismon*. Despite the greater likelihood that men would be involved in violent clashes, families did not see the crisis in the urban sphere as posing an equally acute threat to their sons as to their daughters. Indeed, the parental admonitions cited earlier construct a specific femininity (i.e. ‘pure’) that relies on an ideal of women’s sexual inexperience prior to marriage. These ideals are deployed by different actors, including young women themselves, their families, and the Indonesian state in its gendered development ideology, and shape the way these ideals are interpreted in relation to the material constraints imposed by the crisis. Gender ideals, their links to sexual morality, and the ways they are formulated within particular households and economic contexts are key parts of the post-1997 cultural milieu within which women are pressured more than men to return to their rural origins.

**Spatial Morality: crisis, gender, and mobility**

Whereas previous studies have argued that differences in gender dynamics exist between EPZs in different geographic places (Chant & McIlwaine, 1995b), this study adds attention to the ways that gender norms within EPZ populations in a given place are shaped by forces in both origin and destination sites. Both before and during the crisis, and with two notable exceptions, the migrants to KIMA have remained in relationships with members of their households in rural sending areas and have communicated with their families over what constitutes morally upstanding behavior for young women. Prior to the crisis, many young women migrated to KIMA in search of ‘independence’, often against their parents’ wishes. Gender norms in KIMA, then, were characterized not only by KIMA residents, but also by intergenerational decision-making processes within origin-site households. The ‘culture’ within which migrants were situated drew on norms and contestations within both their rural origins and peri-urban destinations both before and after mid-1997; as these contexts changed, so too did the force of particular cultural pressures influencing their mobility decisions.

Not only do such negotiations between migrants, their families and their neighbors characterize the construction of gender norms within places, these gendered ideas about particular places change over time and under different economic conditions. Since mid-1997, the stigma associated with KIMA has intensified for young single women, and the pressures for these young women to return to their rural homes have heightened. Certainly, the material pressures drawing migrants home are more acute for all KIMA residents as inflation and unemployment rates rise. However, the specific cultural pressures that characterize economic contraints are distinct for women and men.

The gender difference in return migration rates is undergirded by long-standing state and local gender ideologies that support higher wages and better jobs for men and view women’s chastity as in need of protection from threatening spaces such as EPZs. Since the beginning of the *krismon* in 1997, KIMA residents and their origin communities have intensified their scrutiny of young women’s independent mobility and have pressured young women to protect their moral reputations by returning to rural areas. This cultural context, while not determining gender differences in migration rates, places more pressure on women than men to return to their village homes and thereby contributes to the gendering of migration decisions in the region.

Migration decisions are not made within clearly identifiable, discrete cultural or gendered identities (Mills, 1997); instead, they are are made within arenas of competing demands, both ideological and material. The migration decisions that young women
make are structured by the macro-scale inequalities in the Indonesian and global political economy, but they are also organized by the ideologies of gender identity that are available in a given time and place. Further, the way that women themselves understand these gender ideologies within households and under changing economic conditions influences their spatial mobility. Attention to migrants’ and their household members’ gendered notions of the morality of young single women’s residence in KIMA has provided a focus for understanding the ways that these local cultural processes interact with a national economic crisis and global neoliberal trends.

While there are many rich qualitative studies of migration within geography, they have not tended to critically examine conceptions of culture, identity, or gender (for a review, see Silvey & Lawson, 1999). By contrast, the literature on gender and development has produced increasingly sophisticated understandings of gender and identity, moving away from essentialisms and towards greater appreciation of human agency and the contested nature of gender relations (Marchand & Parpart, 1995). This study builds on the recent work in gender and development to highlight the changes in intra-household, cross-place dynamics that are part of the gendered context of migration decisions. In addition, this project has analyzed the ways in which sexual morality and constructions of femininity are contested under changing political-economic conditions, and how these contests are represented in women migrants’ and their communities’ narratives of mobility and the crisis.

Migration research within geography has been notably silent on the issue of gendered interpretations of moral geographies [30]. This project has aimed to add analytical depth to understandings of gender and migration by examining the interlinked material and ideological contexts of changing gendered mobility patterns since mid-1997. Among the migrant population in South Sulawesi’s EPZ in 1998, the morality of young women’s autonomous mobility, and the prostitute as a symbol of the threatened social order, have emerged as defining local tropes of the post-1997 period of political and economic upheaval. The stigma tied to women living independently in KIMA has played an increasingly pronounced role in the narratives of gendered mobility since the beginning of the monetary crisis. More broadly, this suggests that in addition to the concrete pushes and pulls of wage levels and labor market opportunities, the arena of gender ideology constitutes a critical part of the context shaping this group’s mobility decisions.

NOTES

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[2] Throughout this article, I refer to the political and economic upheavals associated with the financial crisis of 1997 as ‘the crisis’. This choice of terminology is based on my observation that in interviews and casual conversation migrants regularly referred to krismen, a shortened version of krisis moneter, meaning the monetary crisis that began to affect their local economy in mid-1997. Some (c.f. Kaehler, 1998) have criticized the use of the term ‘crisis’ to refer to the national-level economic situation, because the term can obscure subnational differences in economic well-being and can reinstate an inaccurate view of the pre-1997 period as ‘miraculous’ for all social classes. I am not invoking ‘crisis’ here in such terms, but rather am focusing on the meaning of crisis (i.e. krismen) as it was used in everyday conversation among the migrants and their origin site communities at KIMA.
[3] When this research was carried out, the city was named Ujung Pandang. However, in 1999, politicians, backed by widespread popular support, renamed the city Makassar, which had been its name prior to independence (1945). I continue to use Ujung Pandang in this article, as that was the name of the place when I carried out the research.

[4] The question of how mobility itself reshapes places, identities, and several scales of discourse is also central to developing an understanding of gendered mobility, but is a topic that is beyond the scope of this article.

[5] All names are pseudonyms in order to protect the anonymity of the respondents. All interviews were carried out by the author in Bahasa Indonesia. These interviews were carried out in West Java and South Sulawesi between December 1994 and December 1995 and during follow-up research in June and July of 1998. For further information regarding methodology, please contact the author.

[6] ‘Moral geographies’ here is defined as the ways in which (in this case, gendered) normative ideologies operate in place-making and shaping spatial mobility and spatial relations. This should be differentiated from the way in which Robert Sack (1999) analyzes a ‘geographic theory of morality’. Sack is focusing on goodness, truth and justice as correlates of morality, whereas my focus is on the social constructions of appropriate and acceptable behavior.

[7] Neoliberal reform packages, and neo-liberal orthodoxy more broadly, are based in their ideal-typical sense on the post-Keynesian view that economies operate most efficiently when free from state intervention, and that maximal economic growth is founded on unfeathered competition driven by the rational, maximizing behavior of individuals and firms (Pearce, 1996).

[8] More recent surveys (for an overview, see Cameron, 1999) indicate that the effects of the monetary crisis on poverty and unemployment have not been as severe as had been first estimated. In addition, the effects of the crisis have clearly been uneven throughout the country.

[9] Habibie and the 1998 Parliament were former Suharto allies and New Order-era elites, and as such have very little legitimacy in the eyes of the public who called for reform in 1997. In addition to these clear reasons for holding demonstrations, there also exists a great deal of evidence that at least some of the riots were instigated by factions within the military who are vying for power and who see covert riot promotion as a strategy for challenging the legitimacy of both the opposition movement and the current government (Walid & Williams, 1998).

[10] The term New Order refers to the years between 1965 and 1998, during which time President Suharto was the leader of the nation’s authoritarian military regime.

[11] Sunindyo (1996) points out that the New Order state’s ideology itself involves contradictions, particularly in terms of its desire to prompt women workers to serve the roles of both domestic worker and laborer for the sake of the development of the nation. However, the overall consensus, and the focus here, is on the idealized gender roles promulgated by the state.

[12] The ‘Outer Islands’ refer to those islands other than Bali and Java.

[13] South Sulawesi is the sixth largest of 27 provinces in Indonesia, with higher populations being found only in Java (BPS [Biro Pusat Statistik—Central Bureau of Statistics], 1990).

[14] For details regarding the specific products manufactured and the Presidential Decrees regulating shareholder ownership of the zone, see Silvey, 1997.

[15] Over 90% of the residents had originated from outside of the city, from regions throughout the archipelago, including Java, North, South and Central Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara Timor, and Kalimantan. More than half of the study population (total n = 60 in 1995 in Sulawesi) came from four key sending areas (i.e. Soppeng, Maros, Jeneponto and Takalar in Sulawesi; Tegal was an important sending area in Java).

[16] Certainly many of the respondents were more eager to share their experiences with me in 1998 than they had been in 1993, because my return visit strengthened their sense of trust and rapport. However, this greater openness does not entirely account for the change in the tenor of discussion of sex work in KIMA. Indeed, this transition was widespread, evident not only in my personal interviews, but also in recent reports on the impacts of the crisis in other parts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region (Floro, 1998; Lim, 1998).

[17] Seventeen of the original 60 migrants interviewed in 1995 remained in 1998 (2 women and 15 men). The others had moved to the city independently (11 men, 1 woman), married and moved to another location (3 men, 4 women), or returned to their village homes (1 man, 23 women). While this survey covers only a small number of respondents, and therefore is not statistically representative, these broad patterns of higher return migration are corroborated by other investigators in Indonesia (Brown, 1998; Cameron, 1999).

[18] Twenty-three women had returned to their rural origins, and of these, only two had married in July of 1998. This pattern suggests that stage in the life cycle does not account for the majority of their rural-destined mobility. The two rural-returnee women who did marry reflect a continuity in gender norms and migration patterns, in that over the last decade, it has been common for factory working
women to return to their villages to marry after working for several years in the zones. The 21 women who remained single after returning to their villages were responding both to job loss and to the increasing social pressure to leave KIMA. Their mobility took place in the context of tightening controls on single young women’s mobility. In addition, their work responsibilities once they returned to their origin-site households reflect the conservative end of the spectrum of state and local norms (i.e., women as childcare workers, house-cleaners and cooks).

[19] The annual Islamic high holy day, also termed Idul Fitri, for which most Muslim Indonesian families who can afford the trip return to homes of their families of origin to visit. While Islam is a very important force shaping gender norms and mobility patterns in a variety of ways throughout the archipelago, and deserves further analysis, this analysis does not examine its role.

[20] All names are pseudonyms in order to protect the anonymity of the respondents. All interviews were carried out by the author in Bahasa Indonesia.

[21] See Silvey (2000) for an analysis of the historical gendering of the South Sulawesian Bugis diaspora, and the transition that the contemporary increases in single women migrants represent in this diaspora.

[22] It should be noted, however, that step-parents are regarded in a relatively negative light overall among the study population.

[23] Mary Beth Mills (1997) reports similar findings, though she focuses on desires for consumption patterns that symbolize modernity in her study of gender, modernity and migrants in Thailand.

[24] KIMA is one of the places within Indonesia that has seen profits rise during the crisis. (See Sarah Turner [1999] for an analysis of the continued relative success of small-scale entrepreneurs in Ujung Pandang since mid-1997.) Because the exchange rate for the rupiah has declined considerably relative to the dollar, those businesses that sell their export products for dollars (e.g., cocoa, cashews) actually saw an improvement in their terms of trade. However, while some factories are performing quite well, I found that the benefits are not reaching the factory workers, because middlemen, commodity traders and factory owners tend to maintain the excess profits for themselves.

[25] While the two women remaining in KIMA were involved in sex work, and they understood this as a stigmatized activity which they had been forced into by the economic crisis, recent research on sex work (Kempadoo & Doezema, 1998) emphasizes sex workers’ agency. In emphasizing sex workers’ agency, this recent research also argues that sex workers should not be conceptualized entirely within the framework of economic and social victimization.

[26] The interpretation of remittances in relation to gendered morality is place-specific. Diane Wolf (1992) found that factory daughters in Taiwan were expected to send remittances in order to maintain their status as morally good daughters. In Central Java, however, parents did not have the same expectation of their daughters. In Sulawesi, while factory working women were in general unable to send remittances, they tended to express disappointment and some shame that they were unable to do so.

[27] Television programming in Indonesia, both on the national channel (TVRI) and the other primary channel, is tightly controlled by the state. Of course, some people have access to satellite connections that permit them to view international programming. However, low-income migrants do not have access to international programming very often, and particularly not when they are living in rural areas.

[28] While Tati’s ideals about mobility and work were tied to a notion of a ‘good’ family, her decisions about work and mobility were not part of a household strategy.

[29] Follow-up research will be necessary to determine what women do after having worked as prostitutes in this EPZ. Alison Murray (1991) has found that in Jakarta, many ex-prostitutes remain involved and welcome in the community of prostitutes, and their income-earning activities shift from sex work to food vending and laundry washing among neighbors after their careers as sex workers come to an end.

[30] There is a rich and growing literature on gender and migration within geography that focuses on the different causes and consequences of women’s and men’s migration, and analyzes the ways that productive and reproductive spheres of activity (Radcliffe, 1991; Chant, 1992) and the age- and sex-hierarchies within households (Lawson, 1998; Leinbach et al., 1992) intersect to influence the gendering of mobility.

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